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Book Reviews
Armed Forces and Society
The Sexual Economy of War: Discipline
and Desire in the U.S. Army
By Andrew Byers
Reviewed by Dr. Jennifer Mittelstadt, professor of history, Rutgers University

T

hree years ago, I taught a course at the US Army War College that
explored the history of the US military’s relationship to economics
markets. Of all our topics, the lesson that generated the liveliest
discussion was the one on sex—how the US military had historically,
both formally and informally, regulated the market for prostitution.
Our historical readings generated tough questions about the military
and its perceived need to regulate sex work to preserve morale, protect
individual and unit readiness, and ensure global military effectiveness.
I wish we had been able to read Andrew Byers’ powerful book to help
us answer our questions. The Sexual Economy of War offers a broad
history of the US Army’s attempt to define and regulate sexual activity—
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the cusp of World
War II. Its case studies and conclusions provide a fruitful perspective
on the military’s complicated relationship to human sexuality.
Byers’s book joins an increasingly robust subfield of histories
on gender and sexuality in the US military. Most studies of sexuality
and the military explore only one topic: prostitution, the regulation
of military family life, the regulation of homosexuality, the treatment
of women military personnel by male military personnel, marriage of
local women abroad to US military personnel, or sexual relations
within the military among personnel. Like no historian before, Byers
combines these different aspects of sexuality under one umbrella and
examines the US Army’s treatment of them as an interconnected whole.
His broad vision reveals sexuality as an unavoidable field in which the
Army must operate.
Through his wide scope and careful research, Byers presents an
argument that will capture the attention of military historians and
historians of US foreign relations: the US military in the decades before
World War II could not modernize or achieve political acceptability,
operational effectiveness, or national and global strategy goals without
regulating sex. In order to professionalize, improve effectiveness,
and expand overseas, the military controlled same-sex desire among
soldiers, supervised officers’ wives and daughters, managed sex work,
monitored sexual health, and censored servicemen’s relationships with
local women in the United States and abroad. Byers reminds readers
that just as the military operates within a political economy of war—a
regulation of who produces what materiel and weapons, who performs
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which services, what these goods and services cost—the military also
operates within a sexual economy of war.
From a deep dive into the records of courts-martial, the US Army
JAG, Inspector General, World War I training camps, and more,
Byers reveals rich and surprising stories of the sexual concerns the military
dealt with from the Spanish-American War until the onset of World
War II. At Fort Riley, Kansas in the 1920s, the Army court-martialed
soldiers who wed surreptitiously to enforce the ban on marriage for
enlisted men. In the Philippines, the military subjected brothels to daily
health checks and price controls to ensure servicemen’s access to sex
without compromising their health and readiness.
During World War I, the Defense Department Committee on
Training Camp Activities imprisoned 30,000 American women
whose potential sexual relationships with doughboys were felt to
imperil relations with the local community and the sexual health
of soldiers. In Europe, the AEF banned sexual relationships with
nonprostitutes, monitored soldiers’ sexualized street behavior, and
discouraged troop marriages to foreign national women to avoid
antagonizing local communities and national alliances. In Hawaii, the
military cracked down on hundreds of men for same-sex relations as
the military increasingly defined homosexual sex as a threat to morale
and discipline.
Byers’s survey of five locations and 50 years of military regulations
and courts-martial reveals how the military regimes of sex regulation
were sharply differentiated based on nationality and locale, class and
rank, homosexuality versus heterosexuality, and racial identity.
He explores how the military tried to stamp out legal and regulated
prostitution in its post communities in the United States but created
elaborate legal and regulated structures in the Philippines and worked
within existing legal regimes in Europe.
The military treated its African American soldiers more harshly
than its White soldiers everywhere, treating Black sexuality as more
dangerous to local relations and unit readiness and morale than White
sexuality. The military prosecuted all forms of nonheterosexuality
brought to its attention, whereas it let some of the same acts pass for
heterosexual soldiers. In France and Germany during and after World
War I, the military prosecuted officers for nonmarital sex and sexually
related conduct unbecoming, but not enlisted personnel. Still, at its
permanent posts in Hawaii, the military prosecuted no officers for
nearly 40 years—only enlisted personnel. And the military veered wildly
between pursuing sexual regulation to preserve health and readiness
versus pursuing morality and its perceived impact on military morale.
Byers shows readers both resilient patterns and stark anomalies.
These patterns and anomalies might be easier to comprehend if
Byers had organized the book thematically rather than geographically.
Instead of centering each chapter on a different type of sexual behavior
in the Army from 1900–41, Byers presents case studies of individual
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posts in Kansas, the Philippines, Louisiana, France, Germany, and
Hawaii. As a result, the book feels choppy and repetitive, as some
chapters march readers through very short sections on the treatment of
each type of sexual regime in each locale.
To account for every issue comprehensively, Byers sometimes misses
opportunities for comparison and deeper causal argument. In the end,
these weaknesses are overcome by the overall impact of Byers’s careful
chronicling of the many sexual regulation efforts over time and across
the globe. Readers cannot put down the book without acknowledging
the sexual economy of war was central to the US military’s earlytwentieth-century development, expansion, and performance.
Current military leaders should read Byers’s history of the US Army’s
pre–World War II struggles to regulate sex to rethink the challenges
facing the US military in recent decades. Today’s efforts—and failures—
to regulate and shape sexuality, sexual activity, sexual violence, and
more have often been treated as novel problems resulting from the
incorporation of women and gay, lesbian, and trans servicemembers into
the military.
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Irregular Warfare
The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts
of the Islamic State Movement
By Haroro J. Ingram, Craig Whiteside, and Charlie Winter
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

T

he purpose of The ISIS Reader is simple yet effective: “to present
the Islamic State movement in its own words, through the texts
and speeches that shaped its evolution from the late 1990s through
the second decade of the twenty-first century,” to provide clarity and
nuance on ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) thought and emotive
processes, and to stress the critical importance of analyzing the primary
sources produced by violent nonstate political actors (1–2). The ISIS
Reader represents an ethnographic study—a strategic red teaming deep
dive—into the hearts and minds of the ISIS intelligentsia who adhere
to Salafi-jihadi norms and values bereft of a separation of church—
here mosque—and state. As a result, all political matters are religious in
nature, all religious matters are political in nature, and ISIS leaders and
common fighters are viewed as holy warriors of God carrying out his will
on Earth never as agents of the state as in the West.
Authors Haroro J. Ingram, a senior research fellow at George
Washington University’s Program on Extremism, Craig Whiteside,
an associate professor at the US Naval War College resident program
at the Naval Postgraduate School and a retired Army lieutenant colonel,
and Charlie Winter, a senior research fellow at the International
Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, have
extensive military and national security careers. Collectively, they have
produced numerous professional and academic publications on the
Islamic State and possess the requisite research expertise to produce
this work. Anas Elallame of the Middlebury Institute of International
Studies at Monterey, the translator of a number of the ISIS works in the
book originally published in Arabic, should also be singled out for his
vital contribution.
The work is divided into acknowledgements, an introduction, four
parts (representing the bulk of the book), a conclusion, a glossary of
Arabic terms-ISIS usage, and an index. The four parts are subdivided
into two chapters on multiple ISIS works from 1994 and 2004; three
chapters on multiple ISIS works from 2006, 2007, and 2009; five chapters
on multiple ISIS works from 2013 through 2016; and five chapters on
multiple ISIS works from 2016, 2018, and 2019. Each of the 19 readings
is sourced to a speech, document, video communiqué, or other media
with background on whether the reading represents an ISIS translation
into English (which is given precedence), a US governmental translation,
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or a translation specifically undertaken for readers and includes detailed
analysis to place it into context and discuss its significance.
The content of the readings ranges from being laden with
mystical metaphors and tribal rituals to presenting a practical strategic
assessment and action plan to offering Caliphate gender guidance to
utilizing strategic messaging to bolster the righteous cause of global
jihad. From a strategic military perspective, the most important readings
are “Zarqawi’s Strategy” (chapter 2), “Advice to Leaders of the Islamic
State” (chapter 4), and “Media Jihad” (chapter 10). Readers will likely
skim the more esoteric and religiously skewed material and rely on the
analysis section to interpret their meaning.
The concluding chapter highlights “Several recurring trends . . .
that are pertinent for scholars wishing to understand the movement and
strategic-policy architects seeking to devise strategies to confront it”
(303). These trends are strategic opportunism, a deft use of propaganda,
and a willingness to openly disclose its future intentions as follows:
“. . . the group’s strategic culture of critical reflection and innovation,
evidence of which continually emerges and re-emerges throughout its
history,” “ . . . the central role afforded to propaganda a mechanism
by which the Islamic State movement competes against foes who are
conventionally superior to it by almost any measure,” and “. . . that [the]
Islamic State has a history of telling its supporters exactly what it intends
to do” (303, 304, 306).
The telegraphing of the strategic intentions of ISIS—like a
boxer providing cues for the next punch he is going to land—is
an important trend to isolate related to this entity. As we know, the
global insurgent Salafi-jihadi struggle with ISIS, or al-Qaeda for that
matter, is far from over.
Faults with the book are minimal. The glossary is missing some
Arabic terms from the text but this omission represents a small
oversight. The footnotes for the analytics section supporting each
reading are solid, however, a “references cited” master listing at the
end of the book would have proven beneficial. Further, no tables or
diagrams were evident and could have been used to better organize
conceptually the numerous readings appearing in the text, their
relationship to ISIS evolutionary phases, and their sourcing and strategic
significance in the introductory and concluding sections of the book.
The Isis Reader is a unique and well-executed resource on
translated Islamic State primary milestone texts and their analysis.
It will serve as an extremely useful primary reference for War College
and related graduate-level program courses focused on a strategic
analysis of the Islamic State as well as a secondary text in courses
focused on Salafi-jihadi radicalization or al-Qaeda and Islamic State
strategic competition.
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Small Arms: Children and Terrorism
By Mia Bloom with John Horgan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international relations and
international studies, Department of Political Science and International Studies,
Georgia Southern University

S

mall Arms: Children and Terrorism addresses an important issue
in terrorism literature—the use of children to carry out acts of
terrorism worldwide. Traditionally, terrorism is a weapon of the weak
and a tool used by groups to coerce a population or overthrow a
regime either through military means or in a more clandestine fashion.
Focusing on children who are recruited, kidnapped, or sold into slavery
and turned into terrorists by organizations such as Boko Haram, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda
authors Mia Bloom and John Horgan, both professors at Georgia State
University, note that “children in violent extremist movements, [often]
referred to as ‘child terrorists,’ are not born. Rather, they are made, and
they learn to want to be a part of a violent group, either with or without the
knowledge and support of their families” (1). The book further “explores
the extent of children’s involvement in terrorist groups and examines
their transition from victims to perpetrators, while demonstrating the
interchangeability of these roles” (3).
Using an economic approach, Bloom and Horgan agree that
“children are not used as substitute goods . . . but as a complementary
goods able to accomplish something adults could not” (15). In many
attacks against infidel forces, children are used for several reasons,
including the fact that children are less likely to arouse suspicion and
can act innocently. “ ‘The Taliban prized child operatives’; one Pakistani
fighter explained, ‘children are innocent, so they are the best tools
against dark forces’ ” (15).
The book also examines the social ecologies of children and their
socialization processes. It focuses on their “parents, families, peer
groups, religious leaders, and other community based institutions, and
how structural conditions pressure children to participate in hostilities”
(5). Children who are recruited or forced into terrorism, especially
the “Ashbal al-Khilafa” (or Cubs of the Caliphate), are groomed and
exploited to victimize others (1). Several channels allow children to be
recruited into terrorist organizations, either against their will or with the
consent and encouragement of their parents or caretakers. It is important
to note that “terrorist leaders across a variety of regions and cultures
tend to shield their own children from involvement, instead focusing
recruitment on young people to whom they are not related” (14).
Another important factor facilitating the recruitment of innocent
children to do the dirty job of adults in terrorist organizations is the
push and pull factors in many areas where the recruitment takes place.
Push factors are “the structural conditions that facilitate involvement
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in terrorism” while pull factors are the “things that make involvement
appear personally attractive to the individual” (16). Finally, recruitment
does not take place ex nihilo. Instead, recruitment is a long process
that “requires years of indoctrination by the media, sources of religious
authority, schoolteachers, and the larger community” (21).
The connectivity explosion, which is shrinking the world and
making sovereignty more porous, has been a force multiplier for terrorist
organizations. As Bloom and Horgan note “the deliberate targeting of
youth online, especially through social media, has exploded in recent
years to near critical proportions, as terrorist groups have become
increasingly savvy at using the internet to disseminate propaganda and
attract new recruits” (25).
Another important contribution by Bloom and Horgan is the
six stages of socialization into a terrorist organization and how the
social ecology of terrorism enhances the appeal of child recruitment:
“seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation, specialization, and
stationing” (140). In the seduction stage, children are enticed to join
a terrorist organization. The process, mainly through propaganda and
outreach activities, shows potential recruits how their lives will be
different once they join the organization.
A similar process takes place in Brazil’s notorious favelas, or
shantytowns, where poor favela youth often join criminal organizations
as a way out of poverty and a means for acquiring quick cash. Many
terrorist organizations shower children with “toy/candy giveaways” and
give speeches and “shows of strength” in addition to shows of executions
and “indirect exposure to IS personnel” (140).
It is also important to remember many terrorist organizations,
like gangs in the United States and worldwide, provide recruits with a
sense of belonging and a purpose in life. Obviously, the outcome of
joining is not optimal since most terrorists are usually captured or killed
and leaving the organization can be complicated if not impossible.
Bloom and Horgan, in their attempt to provide a solution to the very
complex issue of children involved in terrorism, propose eight practical
steps or best practices that could win hearts and minds in order to
reintegrate children who served in terrorist organizations (179).
With the implosion of the Soviet Union and its replacement with
Russia and the “end of history,” the United States, the newly lone
superpower, must confront a new reality—not only terrorism, but
also child terrorism. As Bloom and Horgan state “the ability to win
hearts and minds is what has allowed many of the extremists to operate,
by providing social services and offering benefits where states have
failed to, but also by outlining what they are for and whom they
are against” (181).
In conclusion, Small Arms: Children and Terrorism should be read
by students at the US Army War College. It highlights a topic rapidly
growing in prevalence around the world, and future military leaders
must learn how to deal with this new pandemic problem.
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Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014
Edited by John Blaxland, Marcus Fielding, and Thea Gellerfy
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director, plans and policy, deputy chief of
staff G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

I

n addition to its availability as a free download, Niche Wars is unique
for the breadth of its authors’ expertise—a blending of strategic,
operational, and tactical insights and a frankness rarely seen in such
collective efforts. It provides a valuable opportunity to learn from one of
the United States’ closest and ablest military partners as they confronted
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Niche Wars is organized into four sections and three appendices
(two of which provide helpful chronologies of Australia’s commitments
in the two conflicts). The first section, “Policy and Strategy,” presents
a strategic overview of the country’s national leadership decisions
to commit forces from the perspectives of a minister of defence,
a secretary of the department of defence (generally a long-serving
senior bureaucrat). and a former chief of the defence force. This
trio of chapters sets the strategic context for what follows, making it
clear Australia’s participation was a response to what its government
perceived was, in the words of Minister of Defence Robert Hill, “not
only an attack on our ally the United States but also, and fundamentally,
an attack on our shared values” (23). Significantly, Hill addresses the
failure of the leaders in Washington to include key partners in critical
decisions, observing “I do not think we were even consulted on what
turned out to be two of the most unwise decisions following the
conflict: to disband the Iraq army and the Ba’ath Party,” while admitting
“I think we preferred to pass these responsibilities to others” (28).
There is much wisdom to be mined between these lines.
US officials—civilian and military alike—too often default to a “not
invented here” approach during both preparation and execution;
a default that deprives them of what can be invaluable insights from
knowledgeable parties who might assist in avoiding unfortunate
missteps. Yet, ultimately, the responsibility for outcomes rests with
the coalition lead nation. While partners might be hesitant to assert
their views, lead partner solicitation of input constitutes a win-win.
Resulting views often provide options those immersed in day-to-day
planning or management of operations overlook. Solicitation also
overtly recognizes the truth that the lead nation and partners alike
are in this together and all legitimately have a right to be heard.
Authors of the second section have muddier boots than the
authors of the opening chapters. Here special operations forces—
air and maritime activities—and conventional ground force
challenges in Iraq receive attention along with a rarely heard vantage
point of an international officer embedded in a US headquarters.
The tensions a tactical commander experiences in a coalition
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environment are clear in Anthony Rawlins’s chapter recalling his
tour of duty as commanding officer of the Overwatch Battle Group
West (Two) in southern Iraq. His force served alongside British and
other partners to whom he felt a justified obligation to support in
extreme cases. Those tensions came to the fore when guidance from
the senior Australian officer restricted his force if commitments were
thought to threaten casualties amongst Rawlins’s soldiers. It was a
situation exacerbated by the battle group’s discomfort in not having
full access to strategic intentions from Canberra—to include those
regarding casualty concerns. A situation presenting a conundrum
never fully resolved during the unit’s time in-country.
Section three delves into specific functional areas spanning
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Military functions such as
intelligence, command and control, and civil affairs find complements
rarely provided in conflict compilations; the chapter on the military and
media perhaps being an exception in that regard. Two authors address
undertakings by the Australian Federal Police in Afghanistan during
the period 2007–14, making clear the value of civilian law enforcement
experts who are able to complement military training for a host
nation’s other-than-military security forces. It is a task more difficult
than it might appear. This reviewer’s interviews regarding the British
Army’s experience in the early years of its coalition commitment to Iraq
reflected that while military police can undertake such training, the
differences between military and civilian law enforcement are such that
this approach is not the preferred solution.
The third section concludes with chapters analyzing Australian
Agency for International Development (AusAID) operations and
gender considerations, the latter being particularly significant when
dealing with populations in which female-to-female interactions are
essential to successful intelligence collection, gauging local attitudes,
and not violating social norms. Here as elsewhere throughout the
book, readers will find observations that might stir unpleasant
memories while also constituting worthy reminders of lessons too
valuable to lose.
Dave Savage’s “AusAID Stabilization,” for example, rightly
observes, “often enough, the provision of aid is the easiest part.
The real challenge is ensuring the aid is what is really required, is
compatible with the mission, is not supporting the insurgency, and
is both viable and sustainable over time. Indeed, aid that is poorly
delivered can often be worse than no aid at all” (232). This
observation is again in keeping with several interviews this reviewer
conducted during visits to Iraq and Afghanistan over the past now
nearly 20 years, an observation that calls for providing effective
training to personnel who might be tasked with the authority to
disperse Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds or some
equivalent thereof during future contingencies.
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The fourth section includes several essays that do not fall
into the above three categories with two essays focused exclusively
on lessons thought to be of value during contingencies yet to come.
The five chapters in the closing section are an apt topper to a
worthy collection of essays that will be of interest to readers seeking
a better understanding of these ongoing conflicts and to other
readers with specific functional area interests. Their value, and
that of the book as a whole, extends to conflicts beyond those
involving counterinsurgency to touch on coalition leadership,
occupation responsibilities, and interactions with local populations
and governments—in short, virtually any contingency the future
might hold.

Cities at War: Global Insecurity and Urban Resistance
Edited by Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen
Reviewed by Dr. John P. Sullivan, senior fellow, Small Wars Journal El Centro

U

rban warfare is a constant feature in current and future conflict.
Ranging from civil strife and chronic insecurity to terrorist attacks,
sectarian violence, and components of broader campaigns, urban war
spans both international and noninternational armed conflicts and
criminal armed violence. Most texts look at urban warfare challenges
from the view of the combatant warfighter; others look at the tactical
challenges, including those involved with protecting the populace. This
edited collection, however, looks at urban insecurity from the perspective
of the civilians inhabiting the cities at war.
Editors Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen are influential contemporary
urban scholars. Kaldor is known for her theoretical work on networked
conflict and new wars, while Sassen is noted for her work on global
cities. Both scholars are concerned with global security, violence,
and assemblages of power. Here they articulate the concept of urban
capabilities through the metaphor of the “yogurt run” as seen in the
ability of a farmer in Ghouta, Syria, to negotiate the distribution of dairy
products to residents in embattled Damascus (1). Such urban capabilities
epitomize community resilience and are key to understanding the
dynamics of urban insecurity and conflict.
Kaldor and Sassen use the term new wars to describe a social
condition involving conventional and irregular forces ranging from
militias, private military companies, terrorists, warlords, and criminal
gangs. These new wars are increasingly networked and urban. The global
networks of transnational organized crime and the global economy
connect seemingly disparate conflicts through a range of spaces and
flows. Identity politics and fragmented spaces—including enclaves—
are a means of negotiating the resulting global political economy.
Informal and criminalized markets are integrated into global circuits
and networked assemblages of power. Communities and combatants
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adapt to these realities creating new threats and importantly new
opportunities to forge security and political access.
These new opportunities are a means of coping with, and
managing, perpetual war. Two major models for doing so are the “war
on terror”—militaries directly engaging nonstate forces—and “liberal
peace”—formal stabilization and peacekeeping (11–13). The interaction
between these two models is explored in selected case studies on a range
of conflict scenarios over time.
Chapter 1 by Ruben Andersson looks at Bamako, Mali, a West
African city of almost two million citizens that became a safe haven for
peacekeepers and humanitarian aid organizations. Andersson reviews
the security mechanisms employed by international actors in context of
the geography of intervention and assesses the fragility of the safe zone
established for intervention and the social dynamics that can mitigate
the perception of barricaded enclaves of remote intervention.
Chapter 2 on Kabul, Afghanistan, by Florian Weigand compares
perceptions of security between urban and exurban residents of
Kabul Province’s “zones of (in)security” (54). He argues that inclusive
security practices can “enhance the level of perceived security and
[state] legitimacy” (54). In Kabul both insurgent and criminal violence
contributed to perceptions of security. Police are not always successful
in meeting community perceptions. At times, state intervention—or
misintervention when police are viewed as corrupt or predatory—raises
levels of perceived insecurity. The Taliban is seen as a source of insecurity
and security. Cooperation and community engagement are key.
In Chapter 3 Ali Ali assesses insecurity in Baghdad, Iraq, in the
wake of US intervention and the establishment of green and red security
zones. The “green zone” is a walled secure enclave that shelters its
inhabitants from lawlessness. Citizens living outside the walls in the
“red zone” are subject to violent assaults, terrorists, insurgents, and
gangsters (85–87). State capacity is limited and the need for integrated
and inclusive security measures based upon active engagement has
been established.
Chapter 4, “A Tale of Two Cities” by Mary Martin, examines
insecurity in the twin border cities of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua,
Mexico, and El Paso, Texas. “Narco-insecurity” is explored in light of
border securitization, the war on terror, and “neoliberal security”—
including privatization and the interaction between globalization and
development—as a prelude to reviewing community responses to
counter the insecurity (123–28). Additional discussion on the role of
criminal cartels, cross-border gangs, and narcocultura, as well as allegations
of police collusion with cartels, torture, and corruption would have
enhanced this chapter.
Sobia Ahmad Kaker surveys enclave making in Karachi,
Pakistan, in Chapter 5. Social fragmentation leads to disparate (in)
security perceptions and enclaves heighten insecurity and marginalize
the urban poor. Chapter 6 by Karen Büscher assesses insecurity in
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Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Goma became a safe haven
for peacekeepers and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations
and a refuge for internally displaced persons fleeing active conflict
thus driving increased urbanization. Rebels exploited this stability
to exert political and economic influence and as a foundation for
financial support, recruitment (especially of child soldiers known as
kadogo), and political action.
Chapter 7 by Johannes Rieken, Efraín García-Sánchez, and Daniel
Bear looks at restoring perceptions of security in the aftermath of
insurgent and criminalized conflict in Bogatá, Colombia. Communitybased approaches show promise. Chapter 8 by Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic
explores how (in)security in Novi Pazar, Serbia, is exacerbated
by economic decline, the influx of refugees, identity politics, and
clientilistic governance.
In their conclusion, Sassen and Kaldor emphasize the need for
“tactical urbanism” in response to urban insecurity and future urban
wars and adaptive community responses to conflict (227–29). It also
requires military, diplomatic, and humanitarian actors responding to
urban conflicts recognize the global assemblages of power needed to
integrate local features and actors. Engagement must be direct and
sustained to build trust. In all cases, as in evolving conflicts worldwide,
criminals exploit and participate in conflict. Military leaders at the
strategic level, intelligence and civil affairs personnel, military and
civilian police, and humanitarian actors will benefit from reviewing
this important text to recognize opportunities to enable future “yogurt
runs” (231).
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Military History
Brotherhood in Combat: How African Americans
Found Equality in Korea and Vietnam
By Jeremy P. Maxwell
Reviewed by Douglas Bristol Jr., associate professor of history, and codirector,
Center for the Study of the Gulf South, University of Southern Mississippi

B

rotherhood in Combat is the first comparative history of racial
integration during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It views
Black military service through the aspirations of Black soldiers, who
hoped to prove their right to full citizenship. Jeremy Maxwell argues
Black and White GIs in both wars forged bonds of care and trust in
combat that created racial equality in frontline units, concluding they
“found equality of experience in combat” (18). Maxwell, however,
does not claim the experience of fighting beside men of a different
skin color ended racial tensions in the military. He also distinguishes
carefully between the environment in frontline units and in rear units—
where racial tensions proliferated, especially toward the end of the
Vietnam War. This distinction is important as the evolving civil rights
movement increasingly politicized Black soldiers in Vietnam.
Chapters 5 and 7 substantiate the book’s thesis by analyzing the
experience of combat in Korea and Vietnam through the soldiers’
personal accounts. Maxwell is the first scholar to use the oral histories
of Black veterans from the Veteran’s History Project of the Library of
Congress. Their stories are gripping: “Harold Bryant, a [B]lack combat
engineer operating with the 1st Cavalry Division” during Vietnam,
remembered “one of his platoon members,” who “was a card-carrying
Ku Klux Klan member” (130). The platoon ended up in a firefight,
and the Klansman was cornered. Although Bryant and others “laid
down a base of fire to cover him,” he froze (130). A Black member of
the platoon came to his rescue. The White soldier later said that action
changed the way he viewed Black people. Maxwell uses stories like
this one to demonstrate how the constant threat of danger on the front
lines fostered cohesiveness beyond racial ties.
In contrast, the situation Maxwell describes in the rear units was
racially divisive. To explore these racial tensions, he draws on research in
military records at the National Archives, contemporary news articles,
and oral histories. Enlisted men tended to self-segregate, which when
combined with boredom, resentment against discrimination in the
military, and widespread alcohol and drug use, lessened constraints on
expressing racial animosity. In fact, most racial incidents in Vietnam
happened between off-duty soldiers drinking at service clubs, although
it should be noted Maxwell also discusses riots in stockades and aboard
ships such as the USS Kitty Hawk.
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Despite its broad scope, the book is narrowly focused in some
ways. Maxwell concentrates on the experience of African Americans in
the Army and the Marines, with occasional comparisons to the Navy
and the National Guard. He does not cover the Air Force or the Coast
Guard, nor does he examine women in the military. He explains their
exclusion from combat in the period he studies means their experiences
are not directly relevant to an analysis of Brotherhood in Combat.
Less justifiably, Maxwell does not examine gender, or to be
more specific, masculinity. The recent trend in scholarship on Black
soldiers in Korea and Vietnam has been to explore the impact of the
desire of Black soldiers to have their masculinity recognized on their
perceptions of military service. A study of men bonding in combat
would benefit from investigating whether shared identities as men
performing the ultimate masculine activity—fighting in war—helped
lessen racial differences.
Senior members of the defense community will be interested in
this book for three reasons. First, it illustrates through numerous
examples the importance of placing constraints on expressions of
racial animosity and the consequences of failing to do so. Second, it
discusses the experience of Black and White soldiers in terms familiar
to the defense community, taking into account the practical realities of
the battlefield and rear units. Lastly, it briefly reviews the history of racial
integration through the end of the Vietnam War for readers unfamiliar
with the subject. The first chapter provides background on the issues
facing Black soldiers from the Civil War to World War II. The next
three chapters outline the forces driving integration in Korea, and
another chapter highlights racial issues in Vietnam. Maxwell’s graceful
prose, moreover, is clear and free of social science jargon.
In conclusion, Brotherhood in Combat sheds new light on race
relations in the military during the Korean and Vietnam Wars by
exploring the impact of combat on troops. Maxwell concludes the
military—despite ongoing discrimination—made greater progress
toward racial equality than civilian society through the early 1970s. The
book will be enlightening for anyone working for greater diversity in the
military and trying to understand the persistence of racism.
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Women of Empire: Nineteenth-Century Army
Officers’ Wives in India and the U.S. West
By Verity McInnis
Reviewed by Jody M. Prescott, colonel, US Army (retired)

V

erity McInnis’s monograph on the role of army officers’ wives in
the 1800s in British India and the American West is a must-read
for anyone who wants to better understand the evolution of gender
roles among soldiers and spouses in the contemporary US Army.
McInnis pulls no punches in addressing gender, ethnicity, race, class, and
sexuality in these two different historic military contexts—topics still
relevant today as the US military works to maintain a force driven by
equal opportunity based on merit. Gender, for example, is increasingly
important operationally because of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of
2017 and the Department of Defense strategy that implements it.
With thorough and careful research, McInnis illustrates her
points through observations from the writings and journals of these
women—and some of their husbands. She preserves their language and
nuance, brings their voices to life in breadth and detail, and humanizes
certain points of view modern readers will find unenlightened—and
likely offensive—that must be considered for there to be a rich and
meaningful discussion. Most importantly, the accounts make the book
interesting to read.
McInnis identifies two important similarities between these two
groups of women, bringing them together in her assessment of their
impacts on the administration of both armies and the very different
areas those armies helped administer. First, both groups of women
largely bought into national ideologies based on notions of white racial
and cultural superiority that legitimized the armies’ roles in civilizing
these conquered non-European territories. Significantly, as McInnis
points out, these roles were fostered and implemented in large part by
the officer products of the military academies of each country.
Second, these women, operating within a masculine military
value system that emphasized selfless service and military professionalism
on the part of gentlemen officers, did not merely reflect the prejudices
of their times. Instead, in their complementary role, the women were
active agents who reinforced these prejudices as a means of maintaining
social control over indigenous people and even their own civilian
nationals. This second point is significant when objectively assessing
the women’s impact on their military communities and in the societies
these armies helped govern.
McInnis shows the officers’ wives in these two nineteenth-century
armies enjoyed a degree of responsibility and respect their civilian
counterparts did not. It was common for officers’ wives to derive
authority and status from their husbands’ ranks and create a mirrored
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rank hierarchy within their gender. Within the armies, and particularly
in garrison settings, these women formed effective influence and
communication networks that flowed around the military rank structure.
For example, they often played an essential role in determining whether
other women would make suitable brides for young officers (61–62).
External to the armies, McInnis shows how officers’ wives often
found themselves serving as ambassadors of their particular national
values—from how they comported themselves in ceremonies and social
settings to how they dressed and decorated their homes to how they
interacted on a daily basis with their working-class servants. These
roles all offered opportunities for agency when played well, but they
were not without cost. McInnis notes that “Working within the military
system, however, required the women to live highly regulated lives and
to observe codes of conduct appropriate to their partners’ position in the
imperial hierarchy” (9). In addition, these women often keenly noted a
decrease in their social stature and scope of responsibilities when their
husbands took positions outside military garrisons or retired from active
duty and returned to civilian life.
McInnis does not oversell her argument on the exercise of female
authority in these two armies. She recognizes the women’s accounts
reflect their biases regarding their husbands’ roles as officers
and gentlemen. She also acknowledges these accounts are highly
individualized and cannot fully cover the depth of experience of all
the women who were married to officers serving in India or the
American West. McInnis also appreciates that the voices of those
whom these women considered their social or racial inferiors are
generally not represented in their own words, such as the perspectives
of enlisted men’s wives or those of their African American, Native
American, Mexican, or Asian servants.
The role of Army officers’ spouses today is quite different than it was
in the 1800s, or even in the 1980s, when officers’ evaluation reports might
include information about their spouses’ work with unit functions or
charitable causes. Other things have not changed, such as the challenges
of moving families every couple of years to new duty stations. Today
this challenge also presents professional disadvantages for spouses as
they try to find new jobs, or in the case of dual-career military couples,
equally career-enhancing positions. The military lifestyle is not easy. To
make it work for their families, officers’ spouses still need a system of
shared positive military values to which they can subscribe.
Women of Empire is a valuable contribution to understanding the
history of others who lived and managed the military life in their times.
It provides a well-researched and well-documented launching pad for
honest discussions today about the role of military spouses, both officer
and enlisted, as the US Army evolves to reflect the diversity of the
American people.
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1774: The Long Year of Revolution
by Mary Beth Norton
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

M

ary Beth Norton, a historian who specializes in the history of
the early American republic, is a history professor at Cornell
University and the former president of the American Historical
Association. Her latest book, 1774: The Long Year of Revolution, examines
the 16 crucial months between the Boston Tea Party (December 16,
1773) and the Battles of Lexington and Concord (April 19, 1775) and
captures the voices of the colonists who debated and fumbled along the
path to independence before fighting the formidable British Empire—
the most powerful country at the time.
Norton shows the varied opinions among the colonists, from their
concerns over the authority of England to the justness of British policy
to the condemnation of London’s attempts to levy taxes upon the
colonies. Citing pamphlets, newspapers, and personal correspondence
from the period, she skillfully weaves this material into her narratives,
using the header “Advices from London” to highlight source materials.
She also claims most historians gloss over the details of this pivotal
window in American history and miss the variance of opinions and facts
surrounding the events.
The book is divided into nine chapters, beginning with “The
Cursed Tea” and the early colonial obsession for the dark beverage.
Norton shows the divided public opinion on how to best deal with
the tax on tea and how tea was issued as payment, purchased, and
consumed—though many colonists abstained from using the tea.
In each chapter of the book, Norton highlights the divided public
perceptions in the colonies, leading up to the final chapter, “All Our
Liberties at Stake,” prompting the inception of the conflict that became
the American Revolution.
Norton details how London taxed colonists in North America
with the Molasses Act of 1733, along with a series of subsequent taxes,
including the Cider Tax of 1763 and the Sugar Act of 1764. These taxes,
however, were loosely enforced and circumvented by smugglers. She
believes the issue of taxes in the colonies was most closely associated
with tea.
As late as the early 1770s, the colonists viewed themselves as loyal
British subjects of King George III. Even years later, many Americans
maintained that view—although the colonists were adamant, the British
Parliament did not have the authority to tax them. Surprisingly, some
raucous New Englanders were eager to purchase and consume the
tea, much to the chagrin of the activist group Sons of Liberty. This
issue served as a foundation for the larger problem and debate about
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the authority of the British Parliament to tax the colonies, along with the
mixed public reaction around the colonies.
The North American colonies officially drank over 265,000 pounds
of tea in 1771; they also consumed another 575,000 pounds of smuggled
tea. Most narratives only cover the seven ships loaded with East India
Company tea bound for the colonies. The Boston Tea Party dictates
that many authors primarily focus on the three ships (the Dartmouth, the
Elanor, and the Beaver) that arrived in Boston laden with over 100 chests
of British East India Company tea that would end up in Boston Harbor.
Norton reveals there is much more to the story.
Through a rigorous review of source documents, Norton splendidly
traces the cargo of the four other ships, including the William, the
seventh ship that sank off the coast of Cape Cod in the middle of
December. She pieces together the details of the shipwreck and the
disposal of the tea down to the individual chest. She also provides
vignettes of lesser-known figures, like Jonathan Clarke and John
Greenough from Provincetown, Massachusetts, who oversaw the
distribution of the salvaged tea—much to the frustration of Samuel
Adams who wanted all the tea destroyed. Ultimately, the men used the
Eunice, a Salem fishing schooner, to move the 54 chests and one barrel of
tea to Castle William, located on an island in Boston Harbor.
Norton’s conclusion points out that although Americans did not
draft a Declaration of Independence when the first shots rang out at
Lexington and Concord, colonial leaders had thought and functioned
independently since the founding of the colonies. She closes with the
poem “The Glorious 74,” which extols 1774 as the crucial period leading
up to American independence.
Students of military history and the American Revolution will
appreciate 1774: The Long Year of Revolution. Norton’s in-depth research
and varied source documents serve as a lens into the complex nature and
multiple emotions of independent-thinking colonists who did not fully
comprehend the implications and consequences of their actions.
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Regional Studies
The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US
Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood
By Shuja Nawaz
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, associate fellow, Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University
of London, and non-resident senior fellow, Middle East Institute,
Washington, DC

A

distinguished fellow at the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council,
Shuja Nawaz earned high praise for Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its
Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, 2009), in which he
provided unique insights into the complex dynamics of Pakistan’s army.
His new book, The Battle for Pakistan, validates those accolades and reviews
many topics familiar to readers interested in Pakistan: the assassination
of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 and its repercussions; the challenges Pakistan
faced, from floods to internal security confronting her husband Asif
Zardari, who took control of the People’s Party upon her death and who
refrained from investigating the assassination; the political maneuvers by
former presidents Pervez Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif as they jockeyed
for power; the byzantine relations between successive chiefs of army
staff and their civilian counterparts; the fraught tensions with India; and
throughout, the often contradictory and complicated relationship that
exists between the United States and Pakistan.
While distinguished authors in multiple books have covered these
topics well, The Battle for Pakistan stands apart. First, Nawaz knows
Pakistan inside and out. He understands its byzantine politics—long
dominated by the Bhutto and Nawaz families—in which confecting and
unraveling conspiracy theories is as popular a preoccupation in Pakistan
as NFL football is in the United States. Second, his work stems from
a detailed exploration of these events through a wealth of first-hand
accounts in the United States and Pakistan. Third, he possesses an
unparalleled knowledge of Pakistan’s military. And finally, he applies
wisdom and insights to these events as only an expert with his knowledge
and expertise can do.
Nawaz’s dissection of how Pakistan perceives its relationship with
the United States and the war in Afghanistan packs a punch. Too many
American leaders, he argues, view Pakistan as a nation whose alliance
can be purchased through aid leveraged to influence Pakistani security
policy. American naivete, he notes, is well illustrated by the use of
“Af-Pak” to identify the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan (57).
Richard Holbrooke, who considered himself the house expert on the
region—and on probably most topics that drew his interest—was
taken aback when the astute Bruce Riedel explained the tendency of
some Americans to call Pakistanis “Pakis” was like using the N-word
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in America (67). It is a small item, but readers can draw broader
conclusions from these insights about misfires in forging partnerships
and alliances.
Nawaz is critical of the United States’ failure to forge a coherent
strategy for winning in Afghanistan, a reality Pakistan recognized and
factored strongly into its posture in dealing with Americans. The United
States prosecuted the war on a short-term basis, driven by domestic
politics and the inability to persuade Pakistan to seal the border or
adequately equip the Pakistan army to fight against the Taliban.
Nor, as Pakistani military commanders—especially Chief of Army
Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani—repeatedly complained, did
the United States credit Pakistan with sustaining the huge losses its
military suffered in fighting Islamic extremists. The failure created
bitterness and mistrust, even with the intellectual Kayani, whom Nawaz
views as pro-Western in his outlook. Nawaz argues the United States
was blind in expecting Kayani, for any reason, would put US interests
ahead of Pakistan’s welfare. Kayani understood the conflict would be
drawn out. Like many countries in the region and members of Pakistan’s
political and military establishment, he doubted the United States would
stick it out for the long-term.
Kayani was right, although his insight overlooks the broader
strategic question of how deeply and for how long a strong US presence
in Afghanistan made sense. In the meantime, nerves were rubbed raw
by the takedown of Osama bin Laden, the Raymond Allen Davis affair
in which an American—whom the Pakistanis branded a CIA agent—
killed two Pakistanis, and miscommunications that led in November
2011 to the deaths of two dozen Pakistani soldiers at the hands of
American forces.
Nawaz clarifies the strategic importance of this nuclear-armed
nation of over 220 million citizens to stability in Southwest Asia and the
tremendous work required to strengthen and stabilize relations between
the United States and Pakistan. Improved relations are important even
as Pakistan looks to strengthen its ties with China, which has dealt with
Pakistan by providing aid more adroitly.
In a book laden with rich analysis of pivotal events, the final chapter
with recommendations for the future bears close reading. There is not
space here to recount all of Nawaz’s suggestions, but the bottom line is
that Pakistan must streamline its government, strengthen transparency
and integrity, and bring civilian and military power into equal balance.
While Pakistan’s army has made strides in modernization to address the
current threat environment, the Pakistan government needs to do more
diplomatically, especially in persuading India to reduce the number of
its forces facing Pakistan to stabilize relations more permanently
and avoid a catastrophic nuclear war. Ultimately, Nawaz writes,
“Pakistan’s future lies in emphasizing and building a strong economy
and creating opportunity.”
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Battle for Pakistan is required reading for students of Pakistan and
professionals who deal with this byzantine nation of immensely talented
but—to this observer—strangely insecure inhabitants. The nation’s
stability is essential not only for Pakistan but for the region and the rest
of the world.

China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and
the New Geopolitics of Eurasia
By Daniel S. Markey
Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation

D

uring the past two decades, great-power rivalry for the United
States meant intensifying competition with China. This rivalry for
many American military professionals focused on the military realm,
especially in the Western Pacific maritime domain. Yet, in recent years
there has been greater awareness that the US-China rivalry entails
competition in multiple realms. As the 2017 National Security Strategy
observed, bilateral rivalry with China also includes economic and
political competition. This reality underscores China’s much-hyped “Belt
and Road Initiative”—an ambitious and extensive effort to expand its
economic presence and enhance its political influence worldwide.
China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia
makes important contributions to our understanding of the processes
and outcomes of China’s unprecedented and growing involvement in
countries far beyond its western borders. This timely volume examines
Chinese activities in three regions, focusing on a single country of
particular importance to each region (Kazakhstan in Central Asia,
Pakistan in South Asia, and Iran in the Middle East), and explores in
detail the interactions between these countries and China.
The dominant Belt and Road Initiative narrative in the United
States portrays China as the malevolent economic colossus consumed
with waging “debt-trap diplomacy,” duping defenseless and gullible
governments worldwide into signing predatory loan agreements to
finance desperately needed infrastructure projects in these developing
states. In a variant of this narrative, Beijing bribes local elites to
mortgage their country’s future. The logic undergirding this narrative is
that China fully intends for these governments to default on the massive
debts, ensuring Beijing will own, or at least control, these countries.
China’s Western Horizon is a valuable corrective to this one-sided
narrative. Countries such as Iran, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan are far from
helpless or gullible and often hold significant sway over Chinese decisions
and actions. Markey recounts the origins of the Gwadar port project
in Pakistan. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the United States,
China neither initiated the project nor propelled it forward. Almost
20 years ago, then Pakistani President Musharraf aggressively lobbied
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Beijing to invest in Gwadar, and China reluctantly acceded. According
to Markey, “Gwadar may eventually serve a variety of Chinese goals,
but the port was initially the product of a Pakistani effort launched for
Pakistani reasons” (ix).
Markey effectively captures the domestic dynamics in Kazakhstan,
Pakistan, and Iran. He is especially adept at analyzing Pakistan’s
internal workings and illuminating how the array of governmental and
societal actors shape the outcomes of negotiations between Beijing and
Islamabad. He also deftly maps the geopolitical landscape in the
three regions showing local competitors within each region as well as
external great-power rivals. With his extensive knowledge of South
Asian dynamics, Markey also provides readers invaluable insights into
three key dyads—China-Pakistan, China-India, and Pakistan-India.
He concludes that Beijing’s growing influence and involvement in the
subcontinent could likely produce the “worst of all possible worlds” by
generating greater instability in an already tumultuous region (79).
Moreover, Markey’s nuanced discussion of the soft competition
between Beijing and Moscow is fascinating and on point. While ChinaRussia ties may be the best they have been in many years, underlying
tensions persist, and Central Asia lurks as the issue most likely to bring
these tensions to the surface.
The final chapter outlines implications for the United States and
offers policy recommendations. Markey’s assessment is ominous.
South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all “primed for greater
Chinese involvement, less reform, and more geopolitical competition”
(156). Moreover, “Beijing shows little appetite for assuming responsibility
for the many existing conflicts within and among Eurasian states” (164).
This assessment means Chinese actions are unlikely to contribute to
stability in many countries and may prove destabilizing for others.
Whether other great powers will be willing to assume responsibility
for these regions is not clear. In the coming years, American military
professionals should anticipate heated debates inside and outside the
Beltway regarding the appropriate role and military posture for the
United States on the Eurasian landmass. Markey’s primary advice for
US policymakers is worth restating: acquiring “a clear grasp of local
histories, interests and relationships will be essential to advance
America’s specific . . . interests in Eurasia” (189).
China’s Western Horizon is a tour d’horizon and should be required
reading for anyone grappling with the enormity of America’s China
challenge—whether they sit in Carlisle Barracks, Camp Smith, MacDill
Air Force Base, the Pentagon, or elsewhere.
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Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West
By Keir Giles
Reviewed by Captain Jake Shelton, US Army Special Forces

T

he US relationship with major nuclear power Russia is at its
worst point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Moscow
Rules, Keir Giles offers a unique perspective through his assessment of
the sources of confrontation and shows how Westerners could better
understand Russia and prevent conflict. Widely lauded in academic and
diplomatic circles, the book also has applications for military leaders
focused on countering Russian aggression and should be added to their
reading lists.
Moscow Rules diverges from the popular claim that tension with
Russia is based on Putin’s incursions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria
or election meddling as seen recently in The New Tsar: The Rise and
Reign of Vladimir Putin (Vintage Books, 2016) by Steven Lee Meyers
and Putin’s World: Russia against the West and with the Rest (Hachette
Book Group, 2019) by Angela Stent. Instead, Giles suggests “The
West” mistakenly views Russia as “Western” and incorrectly applies its
standards as it would for other European nations. Through citations
and extracts from Russian leaders and experts, he describes how Russia
is not Western and operates by a different set of rules. While the book’s
sections cover topics from Mongol occupation to recent protests, two
rules summarize the content military leaders can use to help craft their
campaign plans. First, Russia views security as a finite resource, and
second, Russia is culturally nondemocratic.
For the first rule, to Russia security is finite and “History Matters”
(21, 117). This history long precedes the classically cited German
invasions of the twentieth century. For thousands of years, Russia
fell victim to its vast undefendable geography through invasions from
every direction. Giles claims this historical context manifests itself today
through Russia’s continued effort to weaken and destabilize geographic
neighbors and create a security buffer zone (13).
Military leaders who understand this rule can improve upon recent
strategic failures. Russia views a destabilized Ukraine and Georgia
unable to join NATO as directly beneficial to their security. While
countering actions on the border of any country are difficult, the first
rule could have anticipated Russian involvement in Syria and Crimea
to maintain the strategically vital deepwater ports at Latakia on the
Mediterranean Sea and Sevastopol on the Black Sea.
For the second rule, Giles argues the historical oppression of the
Russian people has ingrained state servitude to the near “genetic level”
and highlights public indifference to rigged elections, whitewashed
history, state-sponsored assassinations, and Moscow-backed party line
propaganda to support this assertion (64). An appreciation of this
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cultural difference can aid military leaders in predicting Russia’s actions.
In retrospect, Moscow seems far less rogue for annexing Crimea in 2014
when viewed from their perspective. The Kremlin simply combined
ambition with its indifference to public accountability and annexed what
they had long claimed was already Russia.
Additionally, this nondemocratic culture allows Russians to accept
the “ends justify the means,” such as barrel bombing Syrian cities,
so leaders should not assume Moscow would adhere to the Law of
Armed Conflict (91). Finally, the state oppression of the population
has resulted in an inherent distrust of “outsiders,” which could
diminish the effectiveness of unconventional warfare, psychological
operations, and civil affairs in campaign plans (111).
The book’s only flaw is the author’s bias against President Trump.
While Giles cites facts, quotes, and excerpts throughout Russian
history, he only criticizes the Trump administration. A more robust
argument would include the influence of previous administrations
on Russian relations. This criticism does not significantly detract
from the validity of the book’s arguments, however, as Giles identifies
his bias and acknowledges Russia is only one country in the larger
geopolitical world.
Moscow Rules can help Western leaders gain initiative over Russia
in two ways. First, the sequential nature of Russia’s foreign incursions
indicates direct involvement by leadership at the highest levels. By
creating “competent societies and militaries” across Russia’s border, the
West can overwhelm Moscow’s ability to micromanage (169).
Second, Putin understands excessive defense spending caused the
downfall of the czars and the USSR (156). Moscow, therefore, will
increasingly pursue its interests through proxies and electronic means
further from its periphery. By imposing costs on Russia’s indirect
approach, the West can counter future incursions. Combining these
two approaches will force Russia into a dialogue, as Giles hopes, while
avoiding direct conflict by simply understanding “Moscow’s rules.”
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Strategic Leadership
The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus
Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China
By Matthew Kroenig
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

M

atthew Kroenig argues the United States will prevail in the greatpower rivalry with China because democratic governments are
superior to all other political systems. In his newest book, The Return
of Great Power Rivalry, Kroenig surveys seven historical examples that
highlight democratic superiority over autocratic governments. The book
is well researched, though written primarily for laymen as it avoids jargon
and terms familiar to international relations theorists. Kroenig, however,
does highlight key works by Joseph Nye, Paul Kennedy, and James
Robinson, to name a few.
Kroenig’s thesis is that “democratic countries are better able
to amass power, wealth, and influence on the world stage than
their autocratic competitors,” though many scholars might suggest
China has the potential to provide a unique system that surpasses
democracies (4). Many scholars point out the conclusion is not
preordained, and the outcome is uncertain, contrary to Kroenig’s
claim. This topic is generating volumes of books, with some critics
suggesting China’s one-party system will more closely resemble
Singapore’s hybrid system that blends democratic characteristics with
rule by an elite group. This timely book provides more data to fuel
continued conversations on the topic.
The book is organized into four parts. The first part highlights
potential benefits of each system, and the three remaining parts
concentrate on democratic advantages presented from historical,
contemporary, and future perspectives. The term democracy is
deceptive, and Kroenig reviews one key distinction cited by political
scientists “in which political officeholders are selected through
competitive, popular elections” (18). The distinction, however, is
more nuanced, and he should have added the qualification that the
popular vote for key leadership positions in the government, given the
emergence of hybrid forms of government.
A point of clarification for the layman is the fact that if one were
to ask average Chinese citizens on the street about democracy, they
would say China is democratic, while it will likely grow more democratic
in the future. The confusion is based on a unique understanding of
democracy in China. Economic progress is the crux of the ideological
divide between occidental and orientalist conceptions of statecraft,
and one underscored by the influence of Confucian influence via the
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notion of moral economy. In other words, most Chinese citizens view
the social contract with the government and the people as one that is
predicated on material support and opportunities provided by the state
rather than individual freedom.
Kroenig’s detailed study of key transformations in the European
world will inform students of history while highlighting the benefits
of democracies in European history. His survey of ancient Greek
political theory is useful, though Sparta ultimately won the
Peloponnesian War and the dual monarchy was not democratic and
Athens (a democracy) was defeated. Sparta’s oligarchy, however, did
not last long and fell to Alexander the Great. Kroenig’s claims stretch
the truth at times, such as when he writes, “[D]emocratic states
produce better soldiers,” and “Democracies also enjoy a military
advantage due to their innovation edge,” though most of Europe
between 1939 and 1942 might have disagreed when the Wehrmacht
rolled through Europe with their innovated combined arms blitzkrieg
and panzer divisions (30).
If China’s economy is the largest in the world, other metrics are
meaningful when contemplating international influence. Soft power
is one area where America continues to rank number one for several
reasons including premier secondary learning institutions that are
among the best in the world and an entrepreneurial spirit that is closely
affiliated with democratic forms of government.
The literature surrounding the rise of China and the decline of the
United States continues to be popularized by academics like Andrew
Bacevich and countless others. In 2008 Fareed Zakaria warned we
were entering a post-American world where the United States must
share the world stage with emerging actors like China, India, and
Russia. Since then, geopolitical specialists have highlighted China’s
growing economy and cited statistics from the World Bank to support
their argument that China’s authoritarian one-party system is more
efficient than American democracy.
To cite an example, scholars point to World Bank reports that
highlight the growth in China’s share of the world’s gross domestic
product—in purchasing power parity terms—that skyrocketed from
4.5 percent in 1990 to 18.6 percent in 2018, while noting America’s
share dropped to 15 percent. Since 2011 Chinese patent applications
have surpassed America’s patent applications and have been climbing
higher ever since (World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/).
Senior-level leaders will find The Return of Great Power Rivalry
helpful as a great summary of democratic governments from ancient
Greece to the present, though its real value is in providing case
studies for war theorists. Kroenig does not present a convincing
argument that American democracy will prevail. He admits early in
the book that “Perhaps China will be the sole exception, but every
other state-planned economy in history has hit a wall at some point”
(22). While this statement is true, the jury is still out.
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The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s
Decision to Surge in Iraq
Edited by Timothy Andrews Sayle, Jeffrey A. Engel, Hal Brands,
and William Inboden
Reviewed by Steven Metz, professor of national security and strategy,
US Army War College, and nonresident fellow, Quincy Institute for
Responsible Statecraft

T

he 2003 invasion of Iraq and the long stabilization operation that
followed were seminal events in the evolution of American strategy.
These events naturally spawned a growing genre of analytical literature—
which, in broad terms, developed in three waves. Initial quick looks, most
written by journalists, were published soon after the invasion and in the
early stages of the insurgency. The second wave consisted of more
detailed and rigorous academic assessments and participant memoirs on
tactical and strategic operations. The third wave has only just begun and
reflects newly available information and a greater degree of frankness
made possible by the increasing distance from the conflict.
An initial contribution to the third wave was The US Army in the Iraq
War (Strategic Studies Institute, 2019), a two-volume study based on
thousands of declassified documents and dozens of new interviews with
key participants and leaders. The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush’s Decision
to Surge in Iraq is another important part of the third wave, but it looks
at a very different aspect of America’s involvement in Iraq—President
George W. Bush’s decision in late 2006 to shift from a strategy based
on training Iraqi security forces and disengaging as quickly as possible
to the “surge.” This decision increased the number of US military forces
in Iraq and committed them to working directly with Iraqi security
forces. The surge was based on recognition that the conflict had
changed from an insurgency primarily targeting US forces to a
sectarian civil war; political progress—the ultimate determinant
of success or failure in Iraq—was impossible without improved
population security.
While President Bush gradually accepted the idea that the
United States needed a new strategy over the course of 2006, he knew
a major strategic shift would require adroit management and
salesmanship. The Department of Defense and many senior military
leaders still believed the old “train-and-leave” strategy was working,
and the State Department remained skeptical of sustainable political
reconciliation in Iraq. Additionally, the American public and Congress
were increasingly frustrated by the cost of the operation. This book is
a detailed study of how President Bush decided on the surge and how he
brought the public and the rest of the government on board.
There have been other studies of the surge but none structured
like The Last Card. The first half summarizes 28 interviews—completed
in 2015 and 2016—with key participants in the surge decision. Nearly
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every major player, except former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and US Army General George Casey, was interviewed,
including President Bush. The second half of the book provides
analytical essays by an all-star cast of security experts.
While the book’s contributors vary on their acceptance of the
idea that the surge snatched victory from the jaws of defeat for the
United States, and was a textbook case of how to undertake a major
strategic shift, most contributors agree the shift was an impressive
performance by Bush. He united all the senior policymakers except
Rumsfeld (who left government service shortly before the formal
surge decision), all elements of the government, and much of the
public and Congress behind this shift. Political scientist Robert
Jervis outlines in his chapter that the process demonstrated Bush’s
“extraordinary skill . . . not in his making the decision, but in his ability
to craft what he was doing so that it would minimize the opposition and
allow him to proceed with a united government” (273).
While there are no stunning new revelations in the book, it does
pull together much of what was already known about the surge
decision and fills in additional details, however, it suffers from
two problems. First, the editors rely on oral histories rather than a
blend of oral histories and documents like the Army’s Iraq study.
Interviews are valuable but they are susceptible to selective memory
by those being interviewed. Second, the editors have allowed extensive
redundancy in the analytical chapters. All the chapters are valuable
stand-alone studies of the surge, each with a different perspective or
focus, but since the chapters rely on the same oral histories, identical
narratives—and even quotations—show up many times.
Given the unusual structure of the book and the redundancy of
information, few readers other than researchers performing in-depth
analysis of the surge will find it useful to read cover to cover. That
said, The Last Card is an excellent resource for scholars. It provides
important and authoritative insights into one of the seminal events in
American history.

Book Reviews: Strategy

147

Strategy
Adaptation under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime
By David Barno and Nora Bensahel
Reviewed by Major Zachary Griffiths, operations officer, 2nd Battalion,
10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

I

n fall 2020 the US Army terminated the Asymmetric Warfare
Group and the Rapid Equipping Force. Both organizations adapted
the Army to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but no longer seemed
necessary in the Army’s turn toward “great power competition” (1).
Was this a mistake? In Adaptation under Fire, authors David Barno
and Nora Bensahel explore whether the US military is adaptable enough
to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century.
Barno and Bensahel present a credible case that American
military reform should include building a more adaptable force
in preparation for twenty-first-century conflicts—and they bring
tremendous credibility to the project. Barno commanded US forces
in Afghanistan, while Bensahel achieved tremendous acclaim for her
defense policy expertise.
Employing a comparative case methodology to validate their
recommendations for both practitioners and policymakers, Barno and
Bensahel analyze operational level wartime adaptation. Borrowing
from Amy Zegart’s work on military and intelligence adaptation,
they define adaptability as “a dynamic process that must keep up with
the rate of change” during war with two parts (9). First, adaptations
must have sufficient magnitude to change what an organization does
or how it does it. Second, the change must improve the fit between
an organization and the environment. Big changes that fail are not
adaptation. Small changes that work locally but fail to scale are
not adaptation. Wartime operational level adaptation drives the
entire project.
The book is divided into three parts, with the first part being the
strongest. In the first part, Barno and Bensahel define their terms
and identify the three components for their analytic framework:
doctrine, technology, and leadership. They demonstrate the validity
of their framework by comparing cases of successful and unsuccessful
twentieth-century wartime adaptation. In the second part, they evaluate
American adaptability in Afghanistan and Iraq through their framework.
Finally, in the third part, they explore emerging trends and argue that
the “adaptation gap”—the difference between the anticipated war
and the war that will actually be fought—will continue to grow. They
conclude with recommendations for improving doctrinal, technological,
and leadership adaptation in the US military.
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Structure is one strength of Adaptation under Fire. From the outset,
the book proceeds logically, defining the argument, validating each
component of the framework in existing literature, exploring each
component in the modern context, and then concluding. The early
chapters defining the doctrinal, technological, and leadership elements
of adaptability do this especially well. They start with a bulleted list of
factors associated with adaptability and a two-by-two matrix of the cases
to be explored. For example, the chapter on doctrine lists flexibility,
assessment, inclusive development, and rapid dissemination of changes
as crucial to innovation before exploring the cases. The matrix then
buckets the four cases by whether they are or are not examples of
adaptable doctrine and accurate doctrine. Because of the time the
authors invested in laying out the chapter’s argument, readers can
rapidly advance through the material.
Thorough research is another strength of the book. The authors
draw upon a rich array of sources, including history, political science,
peer-reviewed academic articles, military journals, military doctrine,
and interviews. Nearly 115 of the book’s 430 pages are reserved for
notes and the bibliography. The authors, however, sometimes lean
heavily on one source for a particular case. For example, Steven
Zaloga’s Armored Thunderbolt accounts for seven of 10 citations in
that chapter’s supplemental tank armor case. Notwithstanding the
occasional overuse of a single source, the bibliography is a valuable
resource for scholars and practitioners.
Despite the book’s strong structure and detailed research, the
case selection deserves further scrutiny. As Barno and Bensahel never
explicitly define their case selection criteria, they open themselves
to criticism of either drawing on familiar cases or not fully considering
the full range of possible cases. Despite the lack of criteria, some
comparisons make intuitive sense. For example, the chapter defining
technological adaptation compares four cases of tank innovation: the
World War II “Rhino tank” plow, World War II supplemental tank
armor, World War I French tank development, and World War II
American tank development. With all cases focused on the same type
of technological adaptation in roughly the same time period and
theater, readers can assume omitted variables matter less.
The chapter defining leadership adaptability, however, does this
less well. Can we directly compare the leadership of a captain
in Grenada to a battalion commander in Vietnam, and then to
theater-level commanders in Vietnam in the 1960s and India during
World War II? The varying levels of command, the types of units
(elite volunteer troops versus draftees), the theater of conflict,
political conditions, and the time period wildly differ. While leadership
adaptation may have been the critical variable explaining success, the
large number of other factors at play challenge the conclusion that
adaptive leaders must build a “climate of openness, trust, and candor”
(97). Justification of case selection would better persuade readers of the
argument and help them understand competing factors.

Book Reviews: Strategy

149

In all, Adaptation under Fire effectively argues for adaptability’s
importance in future conflicts. Barno and Bensahel identify and test
doctrine, technology, and leadership as key components of adaptation
analysis before evaluating the American military’s recent performance
and offering recommendations. Readers interested in understanding
how the American military adapted (or failed to adapt) during the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq must read this book. Likewise, scholars
of military adaptability may lean on the common sense doctrine,
technology, leadership framework, detailed notes, and bibliography.
Finally, both uniformed and civilian policymakers may find the
recommendations of Barno and Bensahel helpful as the services
reorient away from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq toward greatpower competition.

Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World
By Fareed Zakaria
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald J. Krieger, US Army, associate dean, Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

F

areed Zakaria is a prolific author, political analyst, host of CNN’s
Fareed Zakaria GPS, and a contributor for the Washington Post. His
latest book, Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World, uses the COVID-19
pandemic as a springboard to reflect on broader globalization challenges
and the evolving nature of human interaction in the world. The book’s
title is deceptive. Although the book is about COVID-19 and other
communicable diseases, it focuses more on globalization and world
politics than diseases.
The book’s main thesis is that American exceptionalism has
fostered complacency and inefficiencies that manifested during
the COVID-19 outbreak. Zakaria argues eloquently that the
US government is in vital need of an overhaul, though he does not
outline specific policy recommendations or revisions that would
be useful for senior leaders in the defense community. Overall, he
provides a solid argument that would have benefited from more
detailed analysis and potential solutions. Nevertheless, all senior
leaders should read the book for a superb summary of the impact of
globalization and the challenges framed by a more connected society.
Readers will also gain a better understanding of epidemics that military
practitioners will face in the future.
Zakaria organizes the book into 10 “lessons,” reviewing the
influence of effective governance, why we should listen to experts, the
impact of the digital life, the social nature of people, rising inequality,
and the transformation of international politics, to cite just a few. He
begins with an overview of global epidemics—from the mysterious
plague described by Thucydides to the infamous bubonic plague
that wiped out half of Europe. Globalization transformed the world,
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virtually eliminating national borders, integrating trade, connecting
remote regions of the world to megacities, and underscoring the nature
of modern intermeshed society.
One conclusion Zakaria draws (lesson 6) is the social nature
of human beings, which became a source of frustration for many
Americans locked in their homes in some parts of the country during
the COVID-19 pandemic, who craved human contact and interaction.
They learned Zoom calls are a pale substitute for social contact. Solving
this crucial human need must be factored into future productivity and
innovative technologies moving forward.
The economic lessons of globalization come with a dire
warning. Zakaria writes, “We have created a world that is always in
overdrive . . . All of these strains and imbalances produce dangers—some
that can be foreseen, and others that cannot” (15–16). Technologist Jared
Cohen’s lesson that only two of the three characteristics of open, fast,
and stable systems are viable without a system spinning out of control
provides insight into modern trade networks (14–15). It is illustrative
to use Cohen’s model to capture the challenges of capitalism that are
open and fast but unstable which is a concern, though serving as a
launching point for the spread of epidemics that will continue to haunt
future generations.
As the global population moves up the income ladder, they will
relocate to dense urban areas with modern technologies. At the same
time, much of the rest of the planet will remain poor and without access
to refrigeration so “wet” markets where animals are kept, killed, and
sold will not be eliminated. The proximity of humans to animals is an
elusive vector to control. Most new diseases, 75 percent of them, such as
AIDS, Ebola, SARS, MERS, the bird flu, and the swine flu, originated in
animals. Future pandemics will become more common, though Zakaria
does not propose specific policies that will help world leaders manage
these events more effectively in the future.
A Facebook post by the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology that was quickly deleted reveals the unspoken reality
of European derision with American systems, specifically health
care systems. At the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic, school
administrators directed students abroad to return home if they were
in a nation with a poorly developed health-care infrastructure, like
the United States. The message highlighted the fact that America is no
longer the shining city upon a hill.
A Stanford study concluded the likelihood of someone moving
from the bottom fifth of income distribution to the top fifth is only
7.5 percent for those born in the United States while Canadians are
almost twice as likely to make the transition (70). Zakaria’s argument
would be more effective if he had examined the same trends in
China where young entrepreneurs have growing opportunities, given
the shifting world demographics. The reality is the future is full of
promise and uncertainty while globalization reminds us that the new
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reality has shifted to an information age where knowledge is the critical
determiner for success.
Zakaria reminds readers of the powerful scene in Lawrence of
Arabia when Peter O’Toole, playing an unforgettable T. E. Lawrence,
turns back to rescue a lost man, reminding those present that we are in
charge of our destiny when he tells them “Nothing is written . . .” (234–35).
He closes Ten Lessons of a Post-Pandemic World by capturing the new
reality of globalization, rising inequality, and changing world
leadership that is a shell of the post-American world. This liminal
period in world history will provide unique opportunities and
challenges as the world emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic. The
future is filled with uncertainty and new opportunities. It is up to
American leaders with public support to take advantage of them.
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Technology and War
Killer Apps: War, Media, Machine
By Jeremy Packer and Joshua Reeves
Reviewed by Dr. Zac Rogers, research lead, Jeff Bleich Centre for the US
Alliance in Digital Technology, Security and Governance, Flinders University,
South Australia

B

iological evolution, and its branch of human epistemology, is
not the work of any naturally occurring optimization function.
It is purposeless drift—adapting and changing as contingencies arise—
with no specified goal or end state. Artificial evolution and machine
epistemology, on the other hand, is pure optimization function. This
distinction is critical in understanding the profound implications of our
techno-anthropological reality. The latter emerged by way of the former
but is in no way determined, controlled, or contained by it. The two
natural forces are inimical—not complimentary or coconstructive in
the way many popular accounts of our technological civilization would
conceive. Part polemic, part historical analysis, part exploration, Killer
Apps, in delivering this news, adds timely perspective to the existing
discourse while avoiding several pitfalls.
The machine episteme is binary and goal oriented—it contains
within it an approximate rationality in which the annihilation of
human life becomes axiomatic. Crucially, the decision of the authors
to position the book’s conceptual center around media is their most
important and original aspect. They show, using well-researched
historical and contemporary examples, how the proliferation of machine
media—any technology that selects, collects, stores, processes, and
transmits information and incurs a manipulation of time and space—
has accumulated via the escalating strategic games of military
competition, to the point where human existence now takes place inside
the confines of an alien and inimical machine episteme.
Chapter 8 clearly states this point: “War is the condition of media
escalation. Media technology propels competition between military
powers in order that it may evolve” (108). Our world and the machine’s
world are codetermined, coproduced, and deeply entangled by our
shared media—but in no way commensurate. In this hybrid world, we
have cocreated, humans are the weak, the slow, the stupid, and the soft
(4). Yet we continue to behave and think, in a tragedy exceeding farce,
as if we are master and conductor.
Within the machine episteme, humans are the noise and the fog.
Our elimination is therefore simply a byline of the machine logic our
strategic escalations have engendered. When expressed in geopolitical
terms, this episteme holds, in the first instance, that the optimal way to
make the world safe for Americans is to depopulate it of non-Americans.
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Something akin to what Carl Schmitt described as a state of “absolute
enmity” (“The Political Character of Absolute Enmity”). Packer and
Reeves show how this binary process of elimination by filtration was
prefigured in early postwar continental air defense, continues in the
ongoing expansion of automated drone warfare and spills over in the
vanguard shift to low-cost, low-energy, fully autonomous AI-driven
swarms. The corollary of this process has been steady human
subordination to the binary machine episteme.
Continuing with the machine logic, the only way to make the
world safe for the machines is to depopulate it of humans—or at least
minimize the “human factor” to the point of its effective irrelevance
(17). Packer and Reeves argue that existing legal constraints, such as
the Department of Defense “human-in-the-loop” policy, are little
more than ornamental (3). The machine episteme and its internal logic
of operational speed and error elimination have overwhelmed any
regulatory expression of normative or ethical prudence. They address
head-on the misguided humanism of the techno-optimists and the
swollen cohort of AI ethicists, who cling to the belief that this regime—
any regime—of scaled media technology can be subordinated to human
intentions. Their demolition of the naive anthropocentrism in this
popular line of thought in Chapter 4 is alone worth the cost of the book.
In expressing this existential fear, Packer and Reeves join a litany
of historical voices, to realize again that knowledge, activated and
materialized via media, is a Promethean gift. They echo C. S. Lewis who
wrote: “Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each
advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In each victory, besides
being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows
the triumphal car” (The Abolition of Man, 1943). While modernity and its
wake has proceeded under denial of this truth, Packer and Reeves have
updated the insight with penetrating acuity.
For the national security, intelligence, and defense communities,
Killer Apps presents both a valuable scholarly resource and a deeply
ambiguous set of questions. As the authors presage in the preface, are
they friend or foe of this community? Defined as it is by the imperative
of knowing the difference, the national security, intelligence, and
defense communities might take Killer Apps as an opportunity to
reflect. The media we have inherited from our forebearers—both
human and machine—incarcerates us in an episteme in which
the prospects of a peaceful existence is itself increasingly subject
to automated annihilation. At a minimum, we should reflect on
the incongruity that thinking of strategic futures might preclude the
very possibility of being human. If it does preclude the possibility,
what does winning mean?
A definitive account of this subject matter will remain elusive—
such an undertaking is yet to be attempted by any authors, past or
present. Reading Killer Apps alongside other related perspectives,
however, such as Philip Mirowski’s Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes
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a Cyborg Science (Cambridge University Press, 2002), Bruno Latour’s
Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard University
Press, 1999), and John Gray’s Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture
at the Close of the Modern Age (Routledge, 1995)—which converges in its
final pages with Killer Apps in its appeal to Heideggerian Gelassenheit—
will reward readers seeking to fill out and augment their understanding
of the phenomena at hand. The task of grappling with the technoanthropological reality is immense.
Stylistically, some readers will find the combined narrative,
historical, and analytical approach deployed in Killer Apps unappealing.
Without doubt, critics will complain of the dearth of solutions
offered. Misanthropes will relish the dystopian tones. But these
types of responses suffer precisely the anthropocentric orientation to
which Packer and Reeves are taking an ax, and for that their
contribution is invaluable. They force readers to transcend the
humanist epistemological orientation in order to understand what
the machine age has truly ushered in.

